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INSURANCE COMPANY'S LIABILITY FOR AGENT'S
ASSAULT
MERCER D. TATE*
On October 10, 1953, an insurance company "field underwriter"
in Philadelphia called at the residence of a recently widowed applicant
and her 18 year old daughter. The "field underwriter" was an investi-
gator whose job was to confirm and add to the medical and other
information contained on the application form submitted to the com-
pany by a sales agent. This "field underwriter," armed with the
original application forms signed by the widow and her daughter
and a black bag resembling a physician's kit, identified himself to the
applicants as a doctor sent by the insurance company. He did not
limit himself to questioning but proceeded to conduct the type of
intimate physical examination which would have been proper only if
he had been authorized to make an examination for the presence of
a hernia. This examination was conducted upon both women. After
the company's authorized doctor actually called upon them about a
week later, they claimed to have suffered severe emotional, mental and
nervous disturbance.
The two women brought suit against the insurance company. A
verdict for the defendant was reversed by the Court of Appeals holding
that it was improper for the trial court to have charged that the "field
underwriter" must have been acting at least in part to further the
purposes of the insurance company in perpetrating this fraud.'
A second verdict for the defendant was reversed for error in
charging the jury that the women must be found to have exercised
ordinary prudence and reasonable diligence in protecting themselves
against improper conduct and fraud of the "field underwriter."' At
the third trial the women declined to testify again and the case pro-
ceeded no further.
This case raises severe problems for any principal which has
agents authorized to have personal contact with members of the public.
It is of particular importance to insurance companies which have
various types of agents who call at the homes of policyholders or
applicants. Since physical examinations are frequently a necessary
part of a life insurance program, the opportunity is great for an insur-
ance company agent clothed with the insignia of his office to pose as
* B.A. 1952, Amherst College; LL.B. 1955, Harvard University; Associated with
the firm of Montgomery, McCracken, Walker & Rhoads, Philadelphia.
Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 243 F.2d 331 (3d Cir. 1957).
2 Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 260 F.2d 521 (3d Cir. 1958).
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a medical examiner. This could also be true in the case of the adjuster
for an accident claim made against an insured party.
A parallel might also be made to the meter reader from a public
utility company, to the milkman, breadman, paperman or grocery
man, or to any employee who, in the normal course of his employer's
business, gains access to a customer's home. However, only the
insurance situations present the agent with an opportunity for physical
contact under color of authority. The other situations all preclude the
possibility of any physical contact having the coloration of authoriza-
tion.
I. VICARIOUS LIABILITY BY RESPONDEAT SUPERIOR
The early American view was that any intentional wrong com-
mitted by a servant was outside the course of his employment.' More
recently, however, courts have generally found a master liable for
the intentional acts of his servant committed within the course of the
servant's employment,4
 and the dividing line has been regarded as
"the wilfulness of the act."'
The traditional approach to a case like the Bowman case, involv-
ing a principal without any special duty, is to apply the test of the
master-servant relation, and if it is found to exist the principal can
be held liable by the doctrine of respondent superior.'
The question has sometimes been viewed as one depending on
whether the insurance company had the right to direct the activities
of its agent to the extent that the relationship of master and servant
exists.' Support for this approach likewise exists in the Restatement,
which provides:
"A principal is not liable for physical harm caused by the
negligent physical conduct of a non-servant agent during the
performance of the principal's business, if he neither intended
nor authorized the result nor the manner of performance,
unless he was under a duty to have the act performed with
due care."'
The cases which support this approach are mostly ones involving
3 Wright v. Wilcox, 19 Wend. (N.Y.) 343 (1838); 2 Mechem, Agency § 1926 (2d
ed. 1914).
4 2 Mechem, Agency § 1926 (2d ed. 1914).
5 Ibid.
6 2 Mechem, Agency §§ 1926-28, 1977 (2d ed. 1914); Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1389
(1938) ; Seavey, Speculations as to "Respondeat Superior," Harvard Legal Essays 433
(1934) ; Note, Master's Liability for the Wilful Assault of His Servant, 34 Ky. L.J. 156
(1946); Annot., 22 A.L.R.2d 1227 (1952).
7 Annot., 116 A.L.R. 1389 (1938).
8 Restatement (Second), Agency § 250 (1958). See also, § 219(2) (d).
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an insurance agent's negligent operation of an automobile while
engaged in company business.° However, these cases all require a
showing that the agent was acting within the scope of his authority.'
The Bowman case ignored this approach and imposed liability
on theories which take a big step toward imposing absolute re-
sponsibility on the principal. 1I
II. AGENT ACTS FOR HIS OWN PURPOSES
The Restatement adopts the rule that:
"A person who otherwise would be liable to another for the
misrepresentations of one apparently acting for him is not
relieved from liability by the fact that the servant or other
agent acts entirely for his own purposes, unless the other
has notice of this." 12
Judge Goodrich's reliance on Section 262 in the Bowman case"
is the only application of that section to an assault by an agent.
However, principals have been sued for the assaults of their agents
on other occasions where the agents acted solely for their own purposes.
For instance, where an insurance company sent a check for the
benefits of a life policy to its agent, who collected it and paid a bill
for preparing the body of the deceased for burial, and later assaulted
9 E.g., Dillon v. Prudential Ins. Co., 75 Cal. App. 266, 242 Pac. 736 (1925); Hail v.
Sera, 112 Conn. 291, 152 Atl. 148 (1930); American Say. Life Ins. Co. v. Riplinger, 249
Ky. 8, 60 S.W.2d 115 (1933); Vert v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 342 Mo. 629, 117
S.W.2d 252 (1938) ; Burdo v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 254 App. Div. 26, 4 N.Y.S.2d
819 (1938); Wesolowski v. John Hancock Mutual Life Ins. Co., 308 Pa. 117, 162 AtI.
166 (1932) ; American Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Denke, 128 Tex. 229, 95 S.W.2d '370 (1936) ;
Fidelity Union Life Ins. Co. v. McGinnis, 62 S.W.2d 186 (Tex. Civ. App. 1933).
10 As to scope of employment, see 47 Mich. L. Rev. 1028 (1949).
11 See 11 Vand. L. Rev. 193 (1957).
12 Restatement (Second), Agency § 262 (1958). Comment a states: "Rationale.
A person relying upon the appearance of agency knows that the apparent agent is not
authorized to act except for the benefit of the principal. This is something, however,
which he normally cannot ascertain and something, therefore, for which it is rational
to require the principal, rather than the other party, to bear the risk. The underlying
principle based upon business expediency—the desire that third persons should be given
reasonable protection in dealing with agents finds expression in many rules, some in
situations in which there is no apparent authority . . . and many in situations in
which there is apparent authority. . . . In all of such cases the other party relies upon
the honesty of the agent, and, if the principal is disclosed or partially disclosed, realizes
that the agent is not authorized if fraudulent. It is, however, for the ultimate interest
of persons employing agents, as well as for the benefit of the public, that persons deal-
ing with agents should be able to rely upon apparently true statements by agents who
are purporting to act and are apparently acting in the interests of the principal. The
line at which the principal's liability ceases is a matter for judicial judgment." Neither
of the illustrations to this section is relevant; they both deal with a deceitful business
transaction and do not involve a physical touching.
13 Supra note 1.
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the bill payer in an altercation over a receipt for the amount paid, it
was held that the company was not liable, since the agent could not
have been acting within the scope of his authority when he committed
such a tort." Likewise, a showing that an alleged assault was within
the scope of employment or was done in furtherance of the company's
business or in its interests was a necessary element for company
liability where an agent for collecting premiums and soliciting insur-
ance committed an assault." It has, however, been held that a railroad
company may be liable for an assault committed upon a person by
the agent in the railroad station checking out baggage." Likewise, a
pullman company is responsible for an indecent assault made upon
a female passenger by a company porter," a cab company is liable
for an assault by its driver upon a passenger," a telegraph company
has been held liable for an indecent proposal made by a messenger
boy to the recipient of a telegram," a bus company has been held
liable for an assault committed upon a passenger by a stranger," a
city-owned public utility was held liable for an assault committed by
its superintendent on a customer who was trying to pay his gas bil1, 21
a bus company was held liable for an assault by one of its drivers upon
a motorist,' and a railroad may be liable where its conductor exceeds
the bounds of propriety and either assaults a passenger" or kisses an
unwilling lady passenger.24
Further, where an agent who was not a physician was sent to see
a policyholder about a claimed sick benefit and injured the claimant
by thrusting an unsanitary spoon into her throat, which was thereby
lacerated, the agent was held to be acting within the scope of his
employment and recovery against the company was allowed." But,
14 Evans v. Metropolitan Life Ins, Co., 202 N.C. 830, 162 S.E. 554 (1932).
15 Anderson v. Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 128 Misc. 144, 218 N.Y. Supp. 494 (Sup.
Ct. 1926) ; Life & Casualty Ins. Co. v. Russell, 164 Tenn. 586, 51 S.W.2d 491 (1932).
16 Georgia R.R. & Banking Co. v. Richmond, 98 Ga. 495, 25 S.E. 565 (1896).
17 Campbell v. Pullman Palace-Car Co., 42 Fed. 484 (ND. Iowa 1890). The same
result was reached where the porter was not even employed by the company at the
time, Dwinelle v. New York Central and Hudson River R.R., 120 N.Y. 117, 24 N.E.
319 (1890).
18
 Korner v. Cosgrove, 108 Ohio 484, 141 N.E. 267 (1923). Likewise, where the
assault was by a person unrelated to the company, Yellow Cab Co. of Atlanta v.
Carmichael, 33 Ga. App. 364, 126 S.E. 269 (1925).
19
 Buchanan v. Western Union Tel. Co., 115 S.C. 433, 106 S.E. 159 (1920).
20 Wilson v. Pan-American Bus Lines, Inc., 217 N.C. 586, 9 S.E.2d 1 (1940). See
South Plains Coaches, Inc. v. Box, 111 S.W.2d 1151 (Tex. Civ. App. 1937).
21
 Munick v. City of Durham, 181 N.C. 188, 106 S.E. 665 (1921).
22
 Tri-State Coach Corp. v. Walsh, 188 Va. 299, 49 S.E.2d 363 (1948).
23 Restatement (Second), Agency § 214, Illustration 3 (1958).
24 Cracker v. Chicago & Northwestern Rwy., 36 Wis. 657 (1875).
25
 National Life & Accident Ins. Co. v. Cruso, 216 Ala. 421, 113 So. 296 (1927).
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where a telephone employee entered a customer's home on a business
mission and while there wilfully and maliciously committed an assault
upon her with licentious intent, the employee was said to have de-
parted from his scope of employment so that no liability could be
imposed upon the principal.26
III. THE PRINCIPAL'S LIABILITY WHERE THE AGENT'S POSITION
ENABLES HIM TO DECEIVE
In its opinion reversing the judgment of the District Court at
the first trial in the Bowman case,' the Court of Appeals placed
reliance upon Section 261 of the Restatement, which provides as
follows :
"A principal who puts a servant or other agent in a position
which enables the agent, while apparently acting within his
authority, to commit a fraud upon third persons is subject
to liability to such third persons for the fraud." 28
It is stated in comment a to this Section that "Liability is based upon
the fact that the agent's position facilitates the consummation of the
fraud, in that from the point of view of the third person the transac-
tion seems regular on its face and the agent appears to be acting in
the ordinary course of the business confided to him." 29
As was the case with Section 262, the Bowman case' is the only
instance of the application of Section 261 to an assault by an agent.
It is difficult to distinguish between Section 261 of the Restate-
ment and the doctrine of apparent authority adopted by the Restate-
ment. Section 261 requires that the agent be "apparently acting within
his authority." The Restatement defines apparent authority as follows:
"Apparent authority is the power to affect the legal relations
of another person by transactions with third persons, pro-
fessedly as agent for the other, arising from and in accord-
ance with the other's manifestations to such third persons.
"Comment:
"a. Apparent authority results from a manifestation by a
person that another is his agent, the manifestation being
28 Hoppe v. Deese, 232 N.C. 698, 61 S.E.2d 903 (1950), 29 N.C.L. Rev. 281 (1951).
Accord, Sauter v. New York Tribune, Inc., 305 N.Y. 442, 113 N.E.2d 790 (1953), 39
Cornell L.Q. 505 (1954).
27 Supra note 1.
28 Restatement (Second), Agency § 261 (1958). The illustrations to this section
present facts constituting a tortious securing of money from the victim rather than a
tortious touching.
29
 Restatement (Second), Agency § 261, Comment a (1958).
30 Supra note 1.
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made to a third person and not, as when authority is
created, to the agent. It is entirely distinct from author-
ity, either expressed or implied. . [A]pparent au-
thority exists only with regard to those who believe and
have reason to believe that there is authority; there can
be no apparent authority created by an undisclosed
principal. .
The first comment to Section 2 7 of the Restatement says that:
"[E]ither the principal must intend to cause the third person
to believe that the agent is authorized to act for him, or he
should realize that his conduct is likely to create such belief.
The information received by the third person may come
directly from the principal by letter or word of mouth, from
authorized statements of the agent, from documents or other
indicia of authority given by the principal to the agent, or
from third persons who have heard of the agent's authority
through authorized or permitted channels of communica-
tion. ' 732
It would appear that the pivotal question in cases of this sort
would be whether the reliance of the third persons on the agent's
authority was reasonable. This requires an examination of the "in-
signia" or indicia of office of the agent. These attributes are granted
to the agent by the principal and are his warranty of authority to the
public with whom his agent deals."
The Restatement provides that:
"Contributory negligence on the part of the deceived
person is not generally recognized as a defense. However, if
a third person should know or otherwise has notice that an
agent is acting for his own purposes or is otherwise violating
his authority, the principal is not liable."34
The Restatement reporter, Professor Seavey, states that contributory
31 Restatement (Second), Agency § 8 (1958). The following Is the Restatement's
definition of the manner in which apparent authority may be created:
"Except for the execution of instruments under seal or for the conduct of
transactions required by statute to be authorized in a particular way, apparent
authority .to do an act is created as to a third person by written or spoken
words or any other conduct of the principal which, reasonably interpreted,
causes the third person to believe that the principal consents to have the act
done on his behalf by the person purporting to act for him."
Restatement (Second), Agency § 27 (1958).
32
 Restatement (Second), Agency § 27, Comment a (1958).
33 See infra, p. 340.
34 Restatement (Second), Agency § 262, Comment c (1958).
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negligence has generally been allowed as a defense to a claim against
a principal only where the agent was not acting within the scope of his
employment (the "wilful wrongdoer"), but he advocates extending
the defense to situations where the agent was acting within the scope
of his employment and the harm resulted in part from the plaintiff's
own lack of care."
However, though it has been advanced by practitioners" and
adopted in an inverse fashion by at least one court, 37 the doctrine of
contributory negligence should have no application to the case where
a wilful tort has been committed. Contributory negligence is a defense
only to negligence. Where a wilful tort has been committed there is
no negligence on the part of the agent, and usually none on the part
of the principal either:"
Nevertheless, this is not to say that the victim has no standard
of care to which to adhere in dealing with the wilful wrongdoer. The
victim's reliance on the agent's authority must always be reasonable,
as is more fully set forth in the following Section.
IV. REASONABLENESS OF THE VICTIM'S RELIANCE
Should the principal be made an absolute insurer? That is the
question implicit in this entire problem. To do so would require that
every insurance company warrant that its agents, whatever they may
be authorized to do, will not assault a third person under any circum-
stances, and that in the event that any such assaults are committed
by its agents it will assume liability for any damage resulting from
them. While some large corporate enterprises might be able to with-
stand the imposition of such liability, there are many small or medium
size businesses which could be bankrupted overnight merely by a
single act of indiscretion by one of its agents, unless it was itself
protected against such loss by a fidelity bond.
If bonding companies are to stand the ultimate loss in such
situations, by virtue of language in the fidelity bond protecting against
the fraud of employees or other risks, they are likely to rewrite bonds
so as specifically to exclude such cases. Or they will raise their
premium rates in accordance with their experience.
However, it is submitted that even the broad language of Judge
Goodrich in the Bowman cases does not impose absolute liability. As
25 Id. § 262, Reporter's Notes.
36 Brief for Appellants, pp. 7-8, Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, supra
note 2.
37 Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, supra note 2,
32 Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, supra note 1.
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the Bowman trial judge said, this would place an intolerable burden
upon a principal.
"It would mean that whenever anyone is in fact defrauded
by an agent, the principal is liable, even though the injured
party's conduct had been careless to the point of utter
recklessness. It is clear . . . that the law of a principal's
liability does not go so far; he is not yet caput lupinum."39
It would seem that the victim's reliance on the agent's authority must
still be reasonable in order to impose liability on the insurance com-
pany. Liability can be imposed only where the agent's authority is
apparent, and reasonable reliance is a basic element of apparent
authority.'"
It has been said that:
"An act not expressly or impliedly authorized does not take
upon itself the quality of an apparently authorized act be-
cause the agent chooses to perform it and the third party,
with whom he deals, accepts the act of the agent; the third
party must use reasonable diligence in ascertaining the
extent and nature of the agent's authority and reasonably
conclude the act to be within it." 41
Agents are frequently ingenious in creating an appearance of authority
by their own acts and statements, but without the creation of the
appearance by the principal there can be no vicarious liability.'
The two necessary elements of apparent agency are that there be
acts by the principal and/or agent justifying belief in the agency and
that the victim's reliance thereon be consistent with ordinary care and
prudence." Furthermore, the exercise of reasonable care and pre-
caution by the victim"' can, in some circumstances, be interpreted to
require an inquiry by the victim to make a reasonable effort to avoid
injury." He cannot blindly trust the agent's statements as to the
30 Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, 159 F. Supp. 701 (E.D. Pa. 1958).
40
 Hansche v. A. J. Conroy, Inc., 222 Wis. .553, 269 N.W. 309 (1936); Yoars v.
New Orleans Linen Supply Co., 185 So. 525 (La. App. 1939).
41 Spann v. Commercial Standard Ins. Co. of Dallas, Tex., 82 F.2d 593, 598 (8th
Cir. 1936).
42 Mechem, Outlines of Agency § 94 (4th ed. 1952). See 1 Mechem, Agency
§ 725, 726 (2d ed. 1914).
48 Mattice v. Equitable Life Assur. Soc'y, 270 Wis. 504, 71 N.W.2d 262 (1955).
Cf. Burton v. Brown, 219 Wis. 520, 263 N.W. 573 (1935).
44 Titus v. Zimbel Brothers, Inc., 34 Pa. D. 8: C. 495 (1939).
40
 Adair v. Paul & Co., 42 Pa. D. & C. 689 (1941).
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extent of his powers.'" He must open his eyes and be diligent in
protecting himself against the falsity of an agent's representations.'
Hard cases arise when the appearance of authority is created
partially by the agent and partially by the principal. The usual situa-
tion involves numerous factors which combine to make up a general
appearance. It would not be equitable to impose liability on the prin-
cipal in any case where it could be said that the victim would not have
been duped had it nOt been for a factor created by the principal.
This would amount to absolute liability, since there will inevitably
be at least the basic factor of some agency relationship which is the
foundation of the fraud and which is admittedly created by the prin-
cipal. It is submitted, however, that vicarious liability will be proper
in any case where there is at least one factor, contributing to the
appearance of authority, without which the victim would not have
been fooled, which was created by the principal and which the prin-
cipal could reasonably have eliminated or prevented or protected
against.
Care must be taken in these cases to assure that there is not
confusion between the principal and his agent in imposing liability.
We are here concerned only with the situation where it is admitted
that a tort has been committed by an agent upon a third party. The
only question is whether, through the principles of the law of agency,
liability for that tort may be imputed to the principal vicariously."
The problem presented is a serious one for any principal which
has agents making close personal contact with customers. This is
especially true where the contact may be in relative privacy. Insurance
companies probably cannot operate effectively if they are not allowed
to go directly to the homes of prospective policyholders or to the
homes of those involved in claims adjustments. Their business would
diminish or become highly inefficient if customers or claimants were
required to go to the insurance companies for examinations. Thus
principals such as insurance companies must have representatives
invested with certain insignia of office under circumstances in which
the possibilities for committing an assault are present. The principal
should avoid giving its agent any implements which would facilitate
the agent's posing as a doctor. Perhaps it would be wise also to show
in bold faced type on any documents containing confidential informa-
tion, carried by such agent, that the documents are not to be used
46 Davidsville First Nat'l. Bank v. St. John's Church, 2% Pa. 467, 146 At!. 102
(1929).
47 MeSCe v. Auto. Ass'n of New Jersey, 8 N.J. Super. 130, 73 A.2d 586 (1950).
48 But see, Bowman v. Home Life Ins. Co. of America, supra note 2.
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in connection with any medical examination. Any calling cards which
the agent is authorized to carry perhaps could be so designed as to
eliminate any possibility of adding the initials "M.D." or the designa-
tion "Dr." either after or before the agent's name, and of course his
actual capacity should be stated on any such calling card.
There may be instances when an insurance company could notify
in writing any applicant or policyholder that a certain named person
will call at about a certain specified time. This may not be possible
where, as in the case of the "field underwriter," a purpose of the call
is to confirm information submitted through a company's sales agent,
since the element of surprise is of some importance to such a call.
However, it would not seem unreasonable to require that, whenever
an insurance company knows that a doctor's call may have to be
made, the insurance company should immediately write to the ap-
plicant or policyholder that such a call may become necessary and
that, if so, notification in writing will be sent in advance specifying
the name of the doctor and the intended time of the visit. This may
not protect against the inside man who has control over the coordina-
tion of doctors and notice letters, but at least it will minimize the risks.
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